ABSTRACT The integration of industrial control systems (ICS) with information technologies offers not only convenience but also creates security problems, from public networks to ICS. Spear-phishing attacks account for a considerable proportion of such security incidents. Therefore, there have been many studies about dealing with spear-phishing attacks. Most of these studies focus on studying strategies with better defense capabilities for spear-phishing attacks while neglecting the cost of implementing the strategies. However, a strategy with strong defense capabilities may not always be highly cost-effective. Moreover, considerable research has tended to consider the attacker and defender separately while ignoring the fact that the spear-phishing attack-defense process is a dynamic process of confrontation between the attacker and the defender. Actually, the deployment of defense strategies should comprehensively consider the defender's condition and the adversary's possible actions. Therefore, how to select the optimal strategy that defends against spear-phishing attacks with minimum overhead is a problem worthy of further study. Motivated by this consideration, we construct the multistage spear-phishing attack-defense signaling game model (MSPAD-SGM), which comprehensively considers the defense capability, the strategy cost, and the possible strategies of the two sides. Based on this model, we propose the optimal strategy selection algorithm for the spear-phishing attack-defense process. In addition, rather than numerical values, we adopt symbolic variables to quantify the payoffs and present a deep analysis of how the variation of payoffs influences the game result, which helps to reduce the subjectivity and improve the feasibility of our model. The simulation and deduction of the proposed approach are presented in a case study of MSPAD-SGM to demonstrate the feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed strategy's optimal selection approach. Our method provides decision support for the spear-phishing attack-defense process and improves the dynamic analysis efficiency of defense decision-making.
I. INTRODUCTION
Industrial control systems (ICS) are key infrastructure in social and economic development. They are widely applied in various fields, such as gas, water, traffic and power grids [1] . Aiming at optimally integrating and reducing costs, common information and communication technologies (ICT) are involved in ICS, which gradually converts the ICS into an industrial control network. However, this results in the exposure of ICS to common ICT vulnerabilities and indirect
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connections to public networks. The critical infrastructures in an ICS are becoming the potential targets of network attacks from malcontented employees, malicious hackers or cyberterrorists [2] . According to the report of ICS-CERT [3] - [6] , the number of ICS security incidents have been increasing quickly in recent years. As a result, an enormous loss of production cost is caused by these security incidents. It is important to note that spear-phishing attacks account for a considerable proportion of these security incidents. The proportions of spear-phishing attacks in the ICS security incidents are 17%, 37% and 27% in 2014, 2015 and 2016, respectively. Spear-phishing is a target-oriented email attack designed to target companies or factories that are known to frequent specific online businesses. These attacks are always hard to discover. Before launching a spear-phishing attack, attackers always make social engineering surveys of their targets. With the help of the collected private information, the attacker can easily deceive victims into downloading malicious files or clicking malicious links embedded in emails. It is called ''spear-phishing'' because the targeting is very precise and narrow, similar to the tip of a spear.
Spear-phishing attacks account for a considerable proportion of security incidents in the ICS, and thus, there have been many studies about dealing with spear-phishing attacks. However, only a few of these studies have focused on the tradeoff between the risk from delivered malicious emails and the cost of blocking benign traffic, such as [7] and [8] . The majority of research has focused on selecting the strategy with stronger defense capabilities while neglecting the cost of the strategy. Therefore, their strategies with strong defense capabilities have not always been highly cost-effective. Moreover, most of the researchers have tended to consider the attacker and defender separately while ignoring the fact that the spearphishing attack-defense process is a dynamic process of confrontation between the attacker and the defender. However, ignoring the connections between the attacker and the defender's decisions does not correspond to reality. An effective defense strategy should consider both the defender's condition and the adversary's possible actions. Therefore, how to select the optimal strategy that defends against the spear-phishing attack with minimum overhead is a problem worthy of further study. Motivated by this consideration, this paper focuses on the security issue of optimal defense strategy selection for the spear-phishing attack.
Game theory is a decision-making theory for studying the direct interaction between decision-making entities. It is characterized by objective opposition, noncooperative and strategic dependence, all of which are in line with the basic characteristics of network attacks and defenses. Applying the game theory to modeling and analyzing network attackdefense processes has become a popular research issue in recent years [9] - [12] . Nevertheless, there have been few studies on spear-phishing attacks based on game theory. Therefore, we introduce game theory to analyze the spear-phishing attack-defense process. The main contributions of this paper are as follows.
(1) Based on a comprehensive consideration of the defense capability, the strategy cost and possible strategies of the two sides, we establish a multistage signaling game model named MSPAD-SGM to model the spear-phishing attack-defense process. According to this model, we proposed an optimal defense strategy selection algorithm for the spear-phishing attack-defense process.
(2) Compared with other literature about optimal strategy selection based on game theory, which has directly adopted numerical value payoffs to analyze the Nash equilibrium, this paper adopts symbolic variables to quantify the benefits, which helps to reduce the subjectivity created by specific numerical value payoffs while improving the feasibility of our model. Moreover, this paper presents a deep analysis of how the variation of payoffs influences the game result, which is lacking in other literature about optimal strategy selection based on game theory.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section II, the related concepts of game theory and the progress of the related work are given. In Section III, the multistage spear-phishing attack-defense signaling game model (MSPAD-SGM) is presented. After that, the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the signaling game model is analyzed, and the optimal defense strategy selection algorithm is designed. In Section IV, a study case illustrates the effectiveness of the proposed model and the practical significance of the selected optimal defense strategy. Finally, our work and future research directions are concluded in Section V.
II. RELATED WORKS
In the study of network security using game theory, there are two key hypotheses that limit the accuracy and scientificity of the game model. One is whether the game information is incomplete for players, and the other is whether the game players' order has a major impact on the game result.
Based on the type of game information, existing research can be sorted into games with complete information and games with incomplete information. Game information is the knowledge about the game features including the strategy set and the payoff function of every player. A game can be defined as a complete information game if every player has the accurate knowledge of other players' knowledge. For example, He et al. [13] proposed a complete information attack-defense model to assess network security risks. They constructed a risk assessment framework in which game theory was used to quantify the probability of threats. Jiang et al. [14] , [15] modeled the network attack-defense as the zero-sum game process. Both players in the game model have complete information and make decisions at the same time. On this basis, they constructed a noncooperation static game model to implement network security evaluation [15] and established a stochastic game model to select the optimal defense strategy [14] . A matrix game was used by Lye and Wing [16] to study the methods of optimal defense strategy selection for the network attack-defense process, which was modeled as a complete information static game. Agah and Das [17] constructed a complete information repeated game model for the wireless sensor network and studied the optimal retransmission strategies selection of the node packets. Considering that smart grids are vulnerable to malicious SQL injection attacks, Esmalifalak et al. [18] constructed a two-person zero-sum complete information game model for SQL injection attacks in smart grids. In their model, the basic strategies were the action times of the attackdefense, and the payoff function was the increase/decrease on power prices. To describe moving target defense confrontation accurately and to obtain the optimal strategy for a moving target defense, Lei et al. [19] constructed a moving target defense game model based on complete information Markov game theory. In their work, the Markov decision process was used to characterize the transition among network multistates. A dynamic game was used to characterize the multiphases of the attack and the defense in moving target defense circumstances.
Since the strategies' payoffs are always the private information for the game players, the complete information hypothesis is hard to implement in realistic attack-defense adversarial networks. To avoid the limitation of complete information, Lei et al. [20] extended their previous moving target defense game model [19] from complete information to incomplete information, which greatly enhanced the versatility of their model. Liu et al. [21] constructed a Bayesian game model for worm attacks based on incomplete information conditions. Jin-Dong et al. [22] proposed a method of optimal defense strategy selection by adopting a static Bayesian game model, and designed an active algorithm for defense strategy selection, which improved the validity and the feasibility of strategy selection. To improve the efficiency of intrusion detection in wireless ad hoc networks, Liu et al. [23] proposed a game theoretic framework to analyze the interactions between pairs of attacking/defending nodes using a Bayesian formulation. Jian et al. [24] presented a framework to analyze the vulnerability of electric grids under different attackdefense scenarios based on the knowledge of game theory. They considered both complete information and incomplete information.
Some of the aforementioned investigations are based on the hypothesis that the attacker and the defender make decisions at the same time, such as [13] , [15] , and [22] . These game models can be defined as static game models. However, in the actual attack-defense scenarios, decision orders are very important in the interaction among players. Different decision orders may significantly impact the results. Therefore, it is more reasonable to consider the decision order. A game can be defined as a dynamic game in which decision order is taken into account. For example, Chen et al. [25] focused on a dynamic game of complete information and explored reliable strategies. Romero et al. [26] proposed a three-level optimization model in the case of a dynamic game of complete information. However, [25] and [26] were limited to complete information. To obtain a more accurate and scientific model, researchers studied signaling game mode which is a dynamic game model with incomplete information. For example, Gao and Zhu [27] analyzed the DDoS mechanism based on a signaling game model and presented the principle of defense strategy selection. Lin et al. [28] constructed signaling games to model the multistep attackdefense scenarios on confidentiality. Zhang et al. [29] established a signaling game model to study the optimal active defense strategy selection in the network attack-defense process. Pawlick et al. [30] extended the signaling game by including a detector that gives off probabilistic warnings when the sender acts deceptively and applied the extended signaling game to analyze leaky deception.
According to the aforementioned research results, we believe that the signaling game model is a powerful model, which provides a significant reference for exploring the game law in the field of network security. The signaling game model has the ability to study the game process with the characteristics of multistage, dynamic and incomplete information, all of which are in line with the spear-phishing attack-defense process. Therefore, we will construct a signaling model to study the optimal defense strategy selection of spear-phishing attack-defense process in the following.
III. MULTISTAGE SIGNALING GAME MODEL FOR SPEAR-PHISHING ATTACK
We present the multistage spear-phishing attack-defense signaling game model in this section and illustrate the game model in 4 subsections. First, we construct the signal game model framework of spear-phishing attack in subsection III-A. Then, we propose a quantifiable method of payoff in subsection III-B. Third, we present the calculation method of the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium in subsection III-C. Finally, we show the optimal defense strategy selection algorithm in subsection III-D.
A. MULTISTAGE SPEAR-PHISHING ATTACK-DEFENSE SIGNALING GAME MODEL
In this subsection, we model the interaction between an attacker and defender in a spear-phishing attack as a dynamic signaling game. The game is a multistage noncooperative game with incomplete information. In this game, players may have their private information which is not common knowledge. On the basis of private information, a player can be modeled as different types, one for each possible state of its private information. It is also assumed that each player knows its own type with complete certainty.
In our game model, there are two players. They are the signal sender and the signal receiver. The game can be denoted as a three stage process. The first stage is that nature chooses the type of sender. The second stage is that the sender sends the signal to the receiver. The last stage is that the receiver receives the signal and chooses the coping strategy against the signal. In the game, the receiver cannot know the types of signal sender, while the receiver has a probability judgment on the types of a signal sender. The signal receiver attempts to make more precise judgments on the type of sender from the received signals, which can help it to select the optimal action. Before sending a signal, the sender adjusts its signal considering f the possible strategies of the signal receiver.
Definition 1: The multistage spear-phishing attack-defense signaling game model (MSPAD-SGM) can be formalized as a seven tuple.
represents the players set of the signaling game. The attacker is the signal sender, and the defender is VOLUME 7, 2019 the signal receiver. N a indicates the attacker, and N d indicates the defender.
is the types set of the attacker and defender. T a = {t 1 , t 2 , ..., t λ } is the type space of the attacker population, where λ ∈ N + and λ ≥ 2. λ is the total number of attacker types. T d = {t} is the only type of defender. The motivation behind our Bayesian game formulation is that a spear-phishing attack-defense game is an incomplete information game. The enterprise's defender is uncertain about the type of his opponent as the defender has no idea whether the email received comes from a regular sender or a malicious sender. In addition, because of the needs of open service, product advertising, social supervision, and commercial interests, the defense strategies taken by the enterprise's defenders are public knowledge to some extent [9] . Therefore, we consider that there is only one type t for the defenders, which is common knowledge to the two players. The scenario of one type of defender is more practical. The type of attacker is related to its attacking behaviors and is the attacker's private information. Thus, we take into account multiple different types of attackers t 1 , t 2 , ..., t λ for satisfying the flexibility and the scalability of our game structure.
.., m m is the signal space of the attacker, where m ∈ N + and m ≥ 1. The signal space is the same for all types of attackers. However, different types of attackers may have different preferences for sending signals. Actually, in a spear-phishing attack-defense process, an email can be seen as a signal. B = {a 1 , a 2 , ..., a n } represents the space of possible action of the defender, where n ∈ N + and n ≥ 1. Possible actions can be trusting the email, deleting the email and so on.
P is the prior beliefs of the defender. P = (p 1 , p 2 , ..., p λ ) represents the defender's initial judgment on the attacker's type t i .
P represents the posterior beliefs of the defender. P t i |m j = (p 1 ,p 2 , ...,p λ ) is the defender's modification for the prior beliefs P by using the Bayesian rule after observing the signal m j . U = (U a , U d ) is the payoff functions set, U a and U d are the payoff functions of the attacker and defender, respectively. It refers to the profit value of the player obtained from the game, which is decided jointly by the strategy of all players. The function U a t i , m j , a k and U d t i , m j , a k denote the payoff value of the t i type attacker and defender, respectively, when the attack signal is m j , and the defense action is a k .
B. PAYOFF QUANTIFICATION OF STRATEGIES
Payoff quantification of attack-defense strategies is the basis for selecting the optimal defense strategy. The accuracy of quantification directly affects the results of the defense strategy selection. In this subsection, we propose a quantifiable method of payoff based on the benefit/cost for MSPAD-SGM.
Definition 2: Attack benefit AB includes the direct benefit and the indirect benefit. Direct benefit refers to the reward of successfully cheating the defender to install a Trojan, such as privacy information and root privileges. Indirect benefit refers to the reinforcement of defenders' trust degree that the email is not malicious.
Definition 3: Attack cost AC is the cost of the human, time and material resources for obtaining the network resources or damaging the system. Definition 4: Defense loss DL is the loss caused by a spear-phishing attack, which is closely associated with the attack benefit AB. Generally, the more an attacker gains, the more the defender loses. Let F( * ) denote a monotonic increasing mapping. The relationship between DL and AB can be denoted as DL = F(AB). To make it simple, we assume that F(AB) = AB in this paper, that is DL = AB.
Definition 5: Defense cost DC is the cost that the defenders spend on strengthening the vulnerability of the system. It includes human and time costs on investment in security devices, and resources loss cost affecting the normal operation of the service.
Definition 6: Normal benefit NB is the benefit that the defender gains from normal operation of the service ruling out a spear-phishing attack and taking defense actions. The concept of NB is based on the assumption that a company or a factory can obtain a profit from normal commercial activities or normal production activities. When a defender receives a malicious email or deletes a normal email, he cannot gain the normal benefit. In this case, NB = 0.
As a result, the payoff value of the attacker in the game can be denoted as:
The payoff value of the defender in the game is defined as:
C. PERFECT BAYESIAN NASH EQUILIBRIUM Definition 7: Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the MSPAD-SGM is a combination of strategies m * (t i ) , a * m j and posterior beliefsp t i |m j . It satisfies:
|m j is obtained according to the prior belief P, the observed signal m j and the optimal strategy a * m j by the defender who uses Bayesian rules.
In the aforementioned definition, a * m j represents the optimal strategy taken by the defender against the signal sent by an attacker after giving the posterior belief, while m * (t i ) is the optimal attack signal the attacker chooses after predicting the optimal action of the defender.
According to the basic theory of the incomplete information dynamic game and the conclusions in [31] and [32] , it can be proved that the Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium of MSPAD-SGM exists.
Theorem 1: For every extensive game, there exists at least one sequential equilibrium [31] .
Theorem 2: For a two-period game (only one round of Bayesian updating) with observed actions and independent types, the sets of perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium and sequential equilibrium coincide [32] .
Theorem 3: A multistage spear-phishing attack-defense signaling game model (MSPAD-SGM) exists with the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Proof: According to Theorem 1, for every finite game, there exists at least one sequential equilibrium. Since MSPAD-SGM is a finite game, then there must exist one sequential equilibrium. Moreover, according to Theorem 2, for a two-period game (only one round of Bayesian updating) with observed actions and independent types, the sets of erfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium and sequential equilibrium coincide. Therefore, as a two-period game with only one round of Bayesian updating, MSPAD-SGM has at least one sequential equilibrium which is equivalent to perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Then, the existence of perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium in MSPAD-SGM is proved.
The process to calculate the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium of MSPAD-SGM is described as follows:
(1) Establishing a posterior belief inferencep t i |m j of the attacker according to Bayesian rules.
(2) Seeking the optimal strategy set of defenders based on the posterior belief inference of the attacker. At the third stage of the game, the defender receives the signal m j and chooses strategy a * m j to maximize its benefits expectation based on the posterior beliefsp t i |m j . The optimal strategy a * m j of the attacker is the solution of the optimal problem below:
(3) Seeking optimal signal m * (t i ) of the attacker based on the inference of the possible strategies that the defender may take. In the second stage of the game, the attacker of type t i predicts the optimal strategy a * m j of the attacker and seeks m * (t i ) to maximize its payoff function. The optimal signal m * (t i ) of the attacker is the solution of the optimal problem below:
(4) Calculating the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium of MSPAD-SGM. Use the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium a * m j , m * (t i ) of the players to determine the defender's inferencep t i |m j on the attacker type which meets the Bayesian rules. If there is no conflict, then a * m j , m * (t i ) ,p t i |m j is the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the spear-phishing attack-defense signaling game model.
D. OPTIMAL DEFENSE STRATEGY SELECTION ALGORITHM
Based on MSPAD-SGM and its perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium calculation procession proposed previously, the optimal selection algorithm of the defense strategy is given as algorithm 1. Construct T a = {t i }, T d = {t}, 1 < i ≤ λ // According to the information of historical security events, construct the attacker type space 4: Construct P // Analyze the probability distribution of the attacker type space based on the historical security events 5: Construct M // Construct the signal space 6: Construct B // Construct the defense strategy space 7: } 8: for i = 1 → λ do 9: for j = 1 → m do 10: for k = 1 → n do 11: Return a * m j , m * (t i ) ,p t i |m j // Output the optimal defense strategy for each player 23: end if
The time cost of the algorithm 1 focuses on a payoff matrix calculation, optimal defense strategy seeking and optimal signal seeking. The time cost of the payoff matrix calculation is O (λ nm). In addition, the computational complexity of the optimal defense strategy seeking and optimal signal seeking are O (max(n, m) ) 3 . The total complexity of the VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 1. The spear-phishing attack-defense scenario.
algorithm is O λnm + (max(n, m)) 3 . The storage cost of the algorithm focuses on the storage of the payoff matrix and the middle vector of the equilibrium calculation. The storage of the payoff matrix has a higher complexity. It contains a total number of nm storage units. Therefore, the storage complexity is O ( nm).
IV. CASE STUDY OF MSPAD-SGM
In this section, we present a spear-phishing attack-defense scenario and show an example with variable payoffs to validate the effectiveness of MSPAD-SGM, the relative equilibrium solution method and the designed optimal strategy selection algorithm. In addition, we present a comparison between this paper and other related papers at the end of this section to show the difference in our work from others.
A. THE SPEAR-PHISHING ATTACK-DEFENSE SCENARIO
A typical spear-phishing attack-defense scenario is shown in Fig. 1 . In the scenario, the defender is an employee of an enterprise. The attacker attempts to attack the information system of the defender's enterprise. The attacker obtains the email address of the defender by a series of social engineering surveys. He imitates the behavior of a normal business partner to send a malicious email to the defender. To make it simple, assume that the attacker can only send two kinds of email. One is used to build trust in the attacker's disguised identity, which is without a malicious link. The other one contains a malicious link. Once the defender is fooled into clicking the malicious link, a Trojan is installed. Actually, as an employee, the defender may receive many business emails every day; he does not know whether the email is malicious or not, but his company has been subjected to a spear-phishing attack. Therefore, the defender has the belief that the normal business emails may be mixed with malicious emails. To make it simple, assume that the defender only has two choices for dealing with an email: one is trusting the email and doing as it indicates, the other one is judging the email to be malicious and deleting it.
B. THE SPEAR-PHISHING ATTACK-DEFENSE SIGNALING GAME TREE AND VARIABLE PAYOFF QUANTIFICATION
To make it easier to understand, by borrowing the Hessian transformation [33] , the spear-phishing attack-defense scenario can be abstracted as a spear-phishing attack-defense signaling game tree shown in Fig. 2 . For simplicity of analysis and discussion, we only consider 2 by 2 games including two kinds of basic attack and defense strategies. To decrease the subjectivity and increase the generality of our model, variables are adopted as the payoff value. When encountering other types of game structures or numerical payoff values, the calculation procedure and analysis method are similar.
In the game tree, the attacker has two types t 1 = Malicious email and t 2 = Normal email. According to the defender's historical experience, p (t 1 ) = α is the proportion of naturally selecting the type t 1 attacker. Meanwhile, the proportion of naturally selecting the type t 2 attacker is p (t 2 ) = 1 − p (t 1 ) = 1 − α. The attacker can send two kinds of signals, m 1 = contain malicious link and m 2 = without a malicious link. The defender has two kinds of defense strategies, a 1 = trust the email and a 2 = delete the email.
When the attacker successfully fools the defender into clicking a malicious link and installing a Trojan, it can obtain a highly direct payoff. It can assume AB (t 1 , m 1 , a 1 ) = H in this case. Meanwhile, when the attacker successfully makes the defender trust his fake identity by email without malicious links, it can obtain a low indirect payoff. In this case,
If the attack fails or the attacker does not launch an attack, and the attacker can gains nothing,
As carrying on a series of social engineering surveys and launch an attack requires some cost, m 1 , a 1 ) = H represents the loss of the defender when he is cheated into installing a Trojan. In addition, DL (t 1 , m 2 , a 1 ) = AB (t 1 , m 2 , a 1 ) = L is the loss of the defender when he trusts a malicious email without links. When the defender receives a normal email, he can gain normal benefit NB (t 2 , m 1 , a 1 ) = NB (t 2 , m 2 , a 1 ) = V 1 , if he trusts the email and does as it indicates. Otherwise, he may delete the normal email incorrectly. It may create a poor influence to the normal business and lead to resource loss DC (t 2 , m 1 , a 2 ) = DC (t 2 , m 2 , a 2 ) = V 2 . Detailed payoff values of the attacker and defender are shown in table 1.
C. PERFECT BAYESIAN NASH EQUILIBRIUM CALCULATION AND DEFENSE STRATEGY SELECTION
According to algorithm 1, we divide the calculation of the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium into four steps: posterior belief inference establishment, optimal defense strategy selection, optimal signal selection and perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium obtainment. In addition, to make it easier to understand, a numerical example is offered.
1) POSTERIOR BELIEF INFERENCE ESTABLISHMENT
Letp (m 1 ) = (p (t 1 |m 1 ) ,p (t 2 |m 1 )) represents the posterior belief inference of the defender on the attacker's type after receiving the signal m 1 andp (t 2 |m 1 ) = 1 −p (t 1 |m 1 ). Meanwhile,p (m 2 ) = (p (t 1 |m 2 ) ,p (t 2 |m 2 )) is the posterior belief inference of the defender after receiving the signal m 2 andp (t 2 |m 2 ) = 1 −p (t 1 |m 2 ).
2) OPTIMAL DEFENSE STRATEGY SELECTION
According to section III-C, perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium, the optimal defense strategy is the solution of the optimal problem on max
The optimal strategy of the defender is the strategy that can create a better payoff. According to (5) and (6), the optimal VOLUME 7, 2019 strategy is shown as (7) .
According to (8) and (9), the optimal strategy is shown as (10) .
Based on the discussion above, 4 optimal defense strategies corresponding to 4 different cases are obtained. The diagram of the 4 cases is shown as Fig. 3 . D i in Fig. 3 represents the possible data range ofp (t 1 |m 1 ) andp (t 1 |m 2 ), i = {1, 2, 3, 4}. More details of D i can refer to (11)- (14) , as shown at the bottom of this page.
In conclusion, the optimal defense strategies corresponding to the different D i is shown below.
Case 1: Case 3:
Case 4:
3) OPTIMAL SIGNAL SELECTION
The optimal signal is the solution to the optimal problem of max
, according to the section IV-C.2 optimal defense strategy selection, the corresponding optimal defense strategy is a * (m 1 ) = a * (m 2 ) = a 1 . For the attacker of type t 1 , it is easy to know that U a (t 1 , m 1 , a * (m 1 )) ≥ U a (t 1 , m 2 , a * (m 2 )) based on (15) and (16) . Therefore, m 1 is the optimal signal.
For the attacker of type t 2 , according to (17) and (18),
. Therefore, both m 1 and m 2 are optimal signals.
, the corresponding optimal defense strategy is a * (m 1 ) = a * (m 2 ) = a 2 .
19914 VOLUME 7, 2019 For the attacker of type t 1 , according to (19) and (20),
. Therefore, both m 1 and m 2 are the optimal signals.
For the attacker of type t 2 , according to (21) and (22),
). Both of m 1 and m 2 are the optimal signals.
, the corresponding optimal defense strategy is a * (m 1 ) = a 1 , a * (m 2 ) = a 2 . For the attacker of type t 1 , according to (23) and (24), m 2 , a  *  (m 2 ) ). Therefore, m 1 is the optimal signal.
For the attacker of type t 2 , according to (25) and (26),
). Both of m 1 and m 2 are optimal signals.
, the corresponding optimal defense strategy is a * (m 1 ) = a 2 , a * (m 2 ) = a 1 . For the attacker of type t 1 , according to (27) and (28),
). Therefore, m 1 is the optimal signal.
For the attacker of type t 2 , according to (29) and (30),
According to the analysis above, we can obtain a conclusion:
(
(2) When (p (t 1 |m 1 ) ,p (t 1 |m 2 )) ∈ D 2 , the optimal strategy of signal selection has four types. (a) m
(4) When (p (t 1 |m 1 ) ,p (t 1 |m 2 )) ∈ D 4 , the optimal strategy of signal selection is m * (t 1 ) = m * (t 2 ) = m 2 or m * (t 1 ) = m 2 , m * (t 2 ) = m 1 .
4) PERFECT BAYESIAN NASH EQUILIBRIUM OBTAINMENT
Based on the analysis of the optimal defense strategy selection and the optimal signal selection, we can calculate the posterior inference using the Bayes rule. When (p (t 1 |m 1 ) , p (t 1 |m 2 )) ∈ D 1 , there are two equilibrium strategies. One is a pooling equilibrium strategy:
In this case, the defender in the left part of the spear-phishing attack-defense signaling game tree (Fig. 2) is in the equilibrium path. According to Bayes rule, we can calculate thep (t 1 |m 1 ) as (31) 
The defender in the right part of the signal tree, which is not in the equilibrium path, also should not exceed the range of
To make it simple, we denote the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium in (34), as shown at the bottom of this page. Therefore, the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the pooling equilibrium strategy can be denoted in (35), as shown at the bottom of this page.
The other equilibrium strategy of D 1 is a separating equilibrium:
In this case,p (t 1 |m 1 ) = 1,p (t 2 |m 2 ) = 1. We can obtain the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium as (33) .
It should be noted that only by H = 0 canp (t 1 |m 1 ) reach the value 1 and not exceed the range of D 1 . However, if the benefit of a successful attack is 0, the attacker will not launch an attack. Therefore, (33) is not an available perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
When (p (t 1 |m 1 ) ,p (t 1 |m 2 )) ∈ D 2 , there are two available equilibrium strategies. They are shown as (36) and (37), as shown at the bottom of the previous page. The solution procedure is similar to the case in (p (t 1 |m 1 ) ,p (t 1 |m 2 )) ∈ D 1 .
When (p (t 1 |m 1 ) ,p (t 1 |m 2 )) ∈ D 3 , the optimal strategy of the defense and signal is a * (m 1 ) = a 1 , a * (m 2 ) = a 2 and m * (t 1 ) = m * (t 2 ) = m 1 or m * (t 1 ) = m 1 ,m * (t 2 ) = m 2 . The available perfect Bayesian Nash equilibriums are shown in (38), as shown at the bottom of this page.
When (p (t 1 |m 1 ) ,p (t 1 |m 2 )) ∈ D 4 , the optimal strategy of the defense and signal is a * (m 1 ) = a 2 , a * (m 2 ) = a 1 and
The available perfect Bayesian Nash equilibriums are shown in (39), as shown at the bottom of this page.
5) NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
To make it easier to understand, a numerical example is offered. As revenue and expenditure of enterprises are always quantized by money; it is reasonable to quantize the payoff values of a spear-phishing attack by dollars. We can assume it takes approximately C = 1000$ for the attacker to make the social engineering surveys and launch a spear-phishing attack. If the attacker successfully makes the defender trust his fake identity by email without malicious links, it can obtain a low indirect payoff L = 2000$. Meanwhile, the benefit of successfully cheating the defender to install a Trojan is 5000$, H = 5000$. The defense cost and normal benefit can be assumed as DC = V 2 = 2000$ and NB = V 1 = 3000$. The probability of receiving a malicious email can be assumed as p (t 1 ) = 0.3.
If the defender receives a signal m 1 (email with a link), the equilibrium path is in the left part of the spear-phishing attack-defense signaling game tree. As p (t 1 ) = 0.3, it is easy to obtainp (t 1 |m 1 ) = 0.3. According to the numerical payoff values, V 1 +V 2 V 1 +V 2 +H = 0.5. Therefore, this case is located in the domain of D 1 or D 3 . From (35) and (38), it is easy to select the optimal defense strategy of the defender that a * (m 1 ) = a 1 (trust the email). The expectation payoff of the attacker and the defender are E (U a ) =p (t 1 |m 1 ) (H − C) = 1200$ and
If the defender receives a signal m 2 (email without a link), the equilibrium path is in the right part of the spearphishing attack-defense signaling game tree. It is easy to obtainp (t 1 |m 2 ) = 0.3 and
= 0.714. Therefore, this case is located in the domain of D 1 or D 4 . According to (39), the optimal defense strategy of the defender is a * (m 1 ) = a 1 . The expectation payoff of the attacker and defender are E (U a ) =p (t 1 |m 1 ) (L − C) = 300$ and p (t 1 |m 1 ) ) V 1 = 500$, respectively.
D. RESULTS ANALYSES
In this subsection, we present the analysis of how the variation of the payoffs influences the optimal strategy selection. In the following, numerical experiments were conducted in two cases.
1) CASE 1: ATTACKER SENDS SIGNAL m 1
According to the calculation of the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium, the relationship between p (t 1 ) and
is the key point that has an important impact on the strategy selection and payoff values. The expectation of the attacker's payoff U a and the defender's payoff U d can be denoted as (40) and (41), as shown at the bottom of this page. Fig. 4 shows the relationship among the attacker's payoff U a , p (t 1 ) and H when L = 2000$, V 1 = 3000$, V 2 = 2000$, C = 1000$. At the beginning, U a increases with the growth of p (t 1 ). It indicates that the attacker can obtain more payoffs with more frequent attacks. However, once p (t 1 ) exceeds the threshold 5000 5000+H , the attacker's payoff creates a change and U a decreases with the growth of p (t 1 ). It indicates that too often, attacks force the defender to select a severe defense strategy. A severe defense strategy leads to the failure of attacks. More attack attempts bring more cost. Fig. 5 shows the relationship between the defender's payoff U d , p (t 1 ) and H when L = 2000$, V 1 = 3000$, V 2 = 2000$, C = 1000$. From Fig. 5 , we can see that with the increase of H , the projection of change point moves close to zero on the axis of p (t 1 ). It indicates that the more loss a successful attack causes, the more sensitive the defender is. It is more likely for the defender to take a severe defense strategy with a higher H .
According to the analyses above, the changes of V 1 and V 2 have the same influences on U a . Therefore, for the sake of simplification, let V = V 1 + V 2 , which represents the gap between the defense cost and normal benefit. Fig. 6 shows the relationship among attacker's payoff U a , p (t 1 ) and V when L = 2000$, H = 12000$, C = 1000$. From Fig. 6 we can see that U a increases with the growth of p (t 1 ) when p (t 1 ) is smaller than the threshold V V +12000 . Once p (t 1 ) exceeds the threshold, the attacker's payoff creates a change and U a decreases with the growth of p (t 1 ). Fig. 7 shows the relationship among the defender's payoff In contrast, in Fig. 5 , with the increase in V 1 (V 2 ), the projections of the change points in Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 move far from zero on the axis of p (t 1 ). It indicates that the more loss a severe defense strategy may cause or the more benefit normal service can offer, the slacker the defender is. It is more likely for the defender to take a slack defense strategy with a higher V 1 (V 2 ).
2) CASE 2: ATTACKER SEND SIGNAL m 2
In this case, the relationship between p (t 1 |m 2 ) and
is the key point of the strategy selection and payoff values. The expectation of the attacker's payoff U a and the defender's payoff U d can be denoted as (42) and (43), as shown at the bottom of the next page. tendencies in case 1. To begin with, U a continues to increase (U d decreases) with the growth of p (t 1 ). Then, once p (t 1 ) exceeds the threshold 5000 5000+L , U a and U d creates a change. U a decreases with the growth of p (t 1 ),while U d increases with the with the growth of p (t 1 ). With the increase in H , the projection of the change point moves close to zero on the axis of p (t 1 ). . Once p (t 1 ) exceeds the threshold, U a and U d creates a change. U a decreases with the growth of p (t 1 ), while U d increases with the with the growth of p (t 1 ). With the increase of V 1 (V 2 ), the projections of change points move far from zero on the axis of p (t 1 ).
E. COMPARISONS WITH OTHER LITERATURE
The comparisons between our method and the other methods are summarized in Table 2 . He et al. [13] and Jiang et al. [14] studied the network attack-defense process and established a no-cooperative static game model based on complete information. Since the payoffs are private information for game players in most cases, the complete information hypothesis is hard to implement in a real game. Then, the practicality of the models and methods are limited. Liu et al. [21] focus their work on worm attacks. Jin-Dong et al. [22] researched network attackdefense processes. Liu et al. [21] and Jin-Dong et al. [22] established static game models based on incomplete information. However, most of the attack-defense processes are dynamic in actuality, which is not compatible with the static game model. Literature [27] , [29] , and this paper established signaling game models, which were more similar to the attack-defense process with the characteristics of multistage, dynamic and incomplete information. Gao and Zhu [27] and Zhang et al. [29] study the optimal strategy selection of DDoS attacks and network attack-defense processes, respectively, while this paper focuses on the specific scenario of a spearphishing attack. Comparing with [27] and [29] , this paper uses symbolic variables to quantify the payoffs and presents a deep analysis of how varying the payoffs influences the game result, which helps to reduce subjectivity and improve the feasibility of the game model.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper constructs a multistage signaling game model to study the optimal strategy selection for the spear-phishing VOLUME 7, 2019 attack-defense process. The game model considers both incomplete information and dynamic interaction between players, which can imitate a realistic spear-phishing attack in a more accurate and reasonable way than the complete information game and the static game. Based on the game model, we proposed an algorithm that can automatically select the optimal defense strategy for the spear-phishing attack-defense process. To reduce subjectivity but increase the versatility of our model, we adopt symbolic variable payoffs to analyze the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium and defense strategy selection. The case study shows that the proposed model and algorithm are suitable for practical application. Our model and algorithm improve the performance of strategy selection and the ability to predict the defense situation, which provides effective guidance for spear-phishing attacks and defenses.
Game theory is an effective tool to study the attack-defense process of network security. Currently, the research on the spear-phishing attack with game theory is still in its infancy. In addition, there are many restrictions on the information requirements, game structure, strategy type and equilibrium solution, which seriously affect the universality and effectiveness of the game models and methods. Improve the game model to better fit a realistic attack-defense scenario and extend it to other confrontation scenarios for information security are our future work.
